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UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16861 (4th Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Anthony and Cleveland Robinson, along with
five codefendants, were charged with and convicted
of various drug related crimes under 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), 846, 848(a), 852 and 860(a). Anthony
was convicted of thirteen counts and Cleveland was
convicted of eleven counts. These convictions in-
cluded conspiracy to possess with intent to distrib-
ute more than fifty grams of cocaine base (crack)
and possession with intent to distribute thirty-six
grams of crack cocaine. Both Anthony and Cleve-
land received life sentences on the continuing crimi-
nal enterprise charge and extensive concurrent sen-
tences on the other counts.
The Robinsons appealed their convictions.
Among the various issues on appeal, the Robinsons
claimed that the federal sentencing guidelines are
unconstitutional because they result in dispropor-
tionate sentences for blacks convicted of drug of-
fenses involving cocaine in the form of crack.
The Robinsons relied on State v. Russell,' where
the Minnesota Supreme Court employed a more
stringent version of the federal rational basis test to
examine the Minnesota drug statute. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court found that the state statute dis-
criminated unfairly based on race. Sentencing un-
der the Minnesota drug laws imposes a penalty of
twenty years in prison for possession of three grams
of crack cocaine, while possession of three grams of
powder cocaine results in only five years in prison.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that harsher
sentencing for violations involving crack cocaine as
compared to powder cocaine had a disproportion-
ate impact on blacks.2 Additionally, the Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that there was not a
rational basis for the differential treatment in sen-
'477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
21d. at 889 (Minn. 1991)(holding that the statutory
distinction between the quantity of crack cocaine pos-
sessed and powder cocaine possessed violated the equal
protection guarantees of the Minnesota constitution).
31d. at 889.
4See Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
s d.
tencing for crack cocaine and powder cocaine un-
der state constitutional law.
3
Current federal law has a sentencing scheme
somewhat comparable to that of the State of Min-
nesota for cocaine violations. Under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, there is a one hundred to one
ratio in sentences for crack as opposed to powder
cocaine.4 For example, current federal law requires
that a first-time offender carrying fifty grams or more
of crack cocaine get the same sentence as someone
who has five hundred grams of powder cocaine.'
The federal sentencing disparities are a result of
Congress deciding that crack cocaine is one hun-
dred times more harmful than the same amount of
powder cocaineY
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the rational basis test should be applied to
judge whether the sentencing guidelines violate the
Equal Protection Clause.7 That is, lacking some proof
or underlying discrimination in the statute, differ-
ential impact may be sustained if it has a rational
basis." According to the court, purposeful discrimi-
nation has yet to be shown in the federal sentencing
guidelines." The court supported the rationality of
the disparate treatment by concluding that "it is com-
mon knowledge that crack is ... much more addic-
tive than powder cocaine.""'
In a more expansive look at the rationality of
the sentencing disparity, the court noted that crack
is less expensive, more accessible, more addictive,
and specifically targeted towards youth." Thus, the
court found that Congress could have rationally con-
cluded that the distribution of crack cocaine is a
greater problem for society than that of powder co-
caine.'2 Therefore Congress had a rational basis for
"See Woodlee, Plan Targets Mandatory Drug Terms,
Washington Post, March 2, 1994 at D1.
, United States v. Robinson, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS






imposing harsher sentences for crack cocaine of-
fenses.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
I. Scope of Judicial Review
The most important aspect of a claim of legisla-
tive violation of the Equal Protection Clause is the
standard of review employed by the court. In deter-
mining the appropriate level of review in the present
case, the court cited Rogers v. Lodge, '3 in that "pur-
poseful racial discrimination invokes the strictest
scrutiny of adverse differential treatment. Absent
such purpose, differential impact is subject only to
the test of rationality."4
The rational basis test puts the judiciary in the
most deferential posture vis-a-vis the legislature.' s
In general terms, the federal rationality or rational
basis test is a two-prong analysis: 1) the statute or
law must not be arbitrary; and, 2) it must bear a
rational relationship to the desired end.'6 Under this
standard of review the courts will almost always
uphold a challenged statute as long as there are some
set of facts that could constitute a rational basis for
the legislation.'
7
On the other hand, the strict scrutiny test is the
least deferential standard of review.' Under strict
scrutiny, the court determines whether the legisla-
tion bears a sufficiently close relationship to a com-
pelling or prevailing governmental purpose.'9 In
13 458 U.S. 613 (1982)(citing Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 247-248 (1976)).
' 4 Rogers, 458 U.S. at 617.
'5 See Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional
Law: Substance and Procedure, § 18.3, at 14 (2d ed. 1992)
(describing rational basis review).
'6 See Kruse, Substantive Equal Protection Analysis
Under State v. Russell, and the Potential Impact on the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1791, 1794
(1993) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 464 (1981), in which the Supreme Court up-
held a state statute which placed a ban on sale of plastic,
disposable milk containers. The Court reviewed the stat-
ute under the rational basis standard and concluded that
the evidence before the legislature supported the classifi-
cation. The Court then looked at whether the classifica-
tion was rationally related to the statute's purpose).
'1 Id. at 1795 (citing Western Southern Life Insurance
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72
(1980)).
"'See Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 15, § 18.3, at 15
(describing strict scrutiny review).
other words, this more exacting standard will not
be employed unless: 1) there is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest; and, 2) there is a close connec-
tion between the challenged legislation and the com-
pelling interest.20 This type of review is generally
only used in instances where legislation is facially
discriminatory.2' Strict scrutiny review will almost
always result in the revocation of the challenged stat-
ute.2 Thus, the aim of those challenging specific leg-
islation is to persuade the court to invoke strict scru-
tiny review.2 To date, the United States Supreme
Court has been unwilling to apply the strict scru-
tiny standard to facially neutral legislation without
proof the challenged law is discriminatory both in
effect and in purpose 24 As previously stated, the
Robinsons needed the federal drug sentencing law
subjected to the standard of strict scrutiny in order
to prevail on their equal protection claim. It is clear
in cases involving crack cocaine violations that the
law is discriminatory in effect. However, discrimi-
natory purpose or intent is not as dear. Discrimina-
tory purpose requires proof that the government
chose a course of action "because of, and not merely
in spite of," the discriminatory impact.25 This phrase
can be interpreted to mean that it is necessary to
show that Congress decided on stricter penalties for
crack offenses because it would have a greater effect
on blacks, and that the disproportionate effect was
not simply a byproduct of facially-neutral legisla-
tion.
'9 See Kruse, supra note 16, at 1796 (citing Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
20See Id. at 1796.
2, See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (holding that Court
will not apply heightened scrutiny when discriminatory
intent is not present); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
243 (1976) (holding that the Court will not invoke strict
scrutiny in absence of discriminatory intent); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (subjecting racial classi-
fication to strict scrutiny review); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (subjecting criminal statute
which classified on basis of race to strict scrutiny review).
2 See Kruse, supra note 16, at 1796.
2 Id.
24Id. at 1797(citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (holding
that discriminatory impact alone fails to trigger strict scru-
tiny); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 US. 535, 546-49 (1972)
(declining to use strict scrutiny review without proof of
invidious intent).2
1See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987)
(holding that statistical proof of disparate impact in capi-
tal punishment cases without evidence of discriminatory
purpose is insufficient to invoke strict scrutiny review).
The 1987 United States Supreme Court case of
McCleskey v. Kemp 6 expanded the intent element
of purposeful discrimination to criminal sentencing
cases. McCleskey, a black male, was convicted of
killing a white police officer and was subsequently
sentenced to death. McCleskey's equal protection
claim relied entirely on a sophisticated statistical
study showing blacks were more likely than whites
to be sentenced to death in Georgia. The Supreme
Court held that statistical evidence of disparate im-
pact alone was insufficient to prove discriminatory
purpose.2 7 McCleskey had to prove that the
decisionmakers in his case acted with discrimina-
tory purpose. In dictum, the McCleskey Court went
on to conclude that disparities in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system.28
The burden of proving purposeful disparate
impact falls on the disparate impact plaintiff. "
Therefore, the Robinsons were in the unenviable
position of having to prove that they received a
harsher sentence because of the color of their skin.
The question of what type of evidence would be
necessary to allow the Robinsons to prove purpose-
ful discrimination remains.
The United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined that the existence of a discriminatory pur-
pose "demands a sensitive inquiry into such circum-
stantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able."3" Furthering the notion that disparate impact
is not irrelevant, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that an invidious discriminatory purpose
may be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts, including the fact that the law has a greater
effect on one race.3' But disproportionate impact




29 1d. at 297 (holding defendant must show
decisionmakers acted with purposeful discrimination).
3'Rogers, 458 U.S. at 618.
3,Washington, 426 U.S. at 235,242 (holding that fed-
eral courts would not utilize strict scrutiny review unless
discriminatory purpose shown with disparate impact. In
key Washington, black applicants for District of Colum-
bia police officers were rejected because of a failed per-
sonnel exam. The plaintiff sued on the ground that the
test was racially discriminatory because of its dispropor-
tionate impact on minorities. The Court concluded that
disproportionate impact, without proof of discriminatory
intent, did not trigger strict scrutiny review).
Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neu-
tral on its face and serving ends otherwise within
the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply be-
cause it may affect a greater proportion of one
race than of another. Disproportionate impact
is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touch-
stone of an invidious racial discrimination for-
bidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it
does not trigger the rule'2 that racial classifica-
tions are to be subjected to the strictest scru-
tiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest
of considerations."
Accordingly, under the purposeful discrimi-
nation requirement, statistical evidence of dispar-
ate impact is relevant in proving discriminatory
intent, but alone it is insufficient to invoke the
higher standard of review in federal equal pro-
tection analysis.34
Additional evidence must therefore be pre-
sented which furthers the conclusion that the
questioned statute has a discriminatory purpose.
As an example, Arlington Heights3 illustrated the
type of proof necessary to satisfy the intent ele-
ment of purposeful discrimination. It suggested
that the historical background of the decision, the
specific events leading to the challenged action,
and any departures from normal procedures
would be instructive in determining discrimina-
tory intent.3"
An examination of the legislative history of the
passage of the federal sentencing guidelines reveals
the following:
I, d. at 242 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964).
,Id.
. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
'1429 U.S. 252,263 (holding that developer failed to
prove discriminatory purpose in housing development
dispute). In Arlington Heights, the Court dealt with the
refusal of Arlington Heights to rezone a parcel of land to
multiple-family from single-family. The Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation alleged that the de-
cision by Arlington Heights would result in racially dis-
parate impact. The Court reaffirmed its decision in Wash.
ington . Davis which required a showing of discrimina-
tory intent.
"'Id. at 267 (concluding that in determining whether
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor required
a sensitive inquiry into all circumstantial and direct evi-
dence as may be available).
Examples [of race-oriented arguments and ra-
cial tension] include Congressional testimony
that most crack sellers are Haitian, black, or
Trinidadian, "wearing gold chains and diamond-
studded bracelets." There were also statements
that black crack dealers would corrupt white
drug users and white communities. These state-
ments clearly indicate an underlying racial
bias. "
Additionally, examples of departures from normal
procedure exist as the Act was hurried through Con-
gress.3 8
Every federal appellate court that has consid-
ered an equal protection challenge in such cases has
come to the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit.
39
One can therefore assume that it is highly improb-
able that any federal court will find that portions of
the federal sentencing guidelines have a discrimina-
tory purpose.
II. Levels of Disparate Impact
The United States Supreme Court did leave a
possible distinction within disparate impact cases in
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.40
The Court stated:
[Slometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on
grounds other than race, emerges from the ef-
fect of the state action even when the govern-
ing legislation appears neutral on its face ....
7 See Maxwell, A Disparity That Is Worlds Apart: The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Treatment of Crack Cocaine
and Powder Cocaine, I REAL Digest (1995) (reviewing
132 Cong. Rec. S4670 (daily ed. April 22, 1986)("Most
of the dealers, as with past drug trends, are black or
Hispanic ... Haitians also comprise a large number of
those selling cocaine rocks ... That's new and discon-
certing... because they previously had not seen Hai-
tians selling drugs. Whites rarely sell the cocaine rocks.
Streets sales of cocaine rocks have occurred in the same
neighborhoods where other drugs were sold in the past:
run-down, black neighborhoods .... But the drug mar-
ket also is creeping into other neighborhoods. An interra-
cial neighborhood ... has become one of West Palm
Beach's most highly visible cocaine rock areas. Less than
a block from where unsuspecting white retirees play ten-
nis, bands of young black men push their rocks on passing
motorists, interested or not").
" Id. (citing United States v. Walls, 841 F. Supp. 24,
29 (D.D.C. 1994)("In further reference to departure from
normal legislative procedure, amici also offered Sterling's
observation that: [t]he development of this omnibus bill
was extraordinary. Typically Members introduce bills
The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.
But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark
as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is
not determinative and the Court must look to
other evidence.
4'
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 2 the statute in question al-
lowed the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to
grant permits to operate laundries in wooden build-
ings. The regulation, although facially neutral, re-
sulted in a huge disparity between the applicants
receiving the permits. The board granted permits to
almost all of the white applicants, while none of the
Chinese applicants were granted similar permits. In
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,43 the Alabama legislature
reconfigured the corporate boundary of a city from
a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure which re-
sulted in the exclusion of all but four or five of the
previously four hundred black voters while not dis-
placing any white voters. The United States Supreme
Court thus has set up a difference between simple
disparate impact cases and "stark" disparate impact
cases (as illustrated in Yick Wo and Gomillion). By
stating that "absent a pattern as stark as Gomillion
and Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative,"
44
the Court allows for the inference that if there is
impact as stark as is presented by these cases, then
impact alone may be sufficient to show discrimina-
tory purpose. Thereby, the United States Supreme
Court presumes a discriminatory purpose in such
"stark" cases and places the burden on the govern-
which are referenced to a subcommittee, and hearings are
held on the bills. Comment is invited from the Adminis-
tration, the Judicial Conference, and organizations that
have expertise on the issue. A markup is held on a bill,
and amendments are offered to it. For this omnibus bill
much of this procedure was dispensed with. The careful
deliberative practices of the Congress were set aside for
the drug bill"); 123 Cong. Rec. S13969 (daily ed. Sept.
27, 1986)(statement by Sen. Bingaman)("Despite the
necessity of this legislation, our haste to enact a drug bill
before we adjourn this Congress raises some questions
and some potential concerns.Are we acting to insure short
term political gain from a sudden and popularly recog-
nized problem? Or are we making a commitment to ad-
dress a serious social malaise?").
39 See United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92 (3rd Cir.
1992), cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 1662; United States v. Watson,
953 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied.
40 See supra note 21.
41 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
42 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
43364 U.S. 339 (1960).
"Arlington Heights, 492 U.S. at 266.
ment to show "no intent." This line of reasoning is
consistent with Justice Marshall's dissent in Person-
nel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney,4s even though it
is a gender discrimination case. Justice Marshall con-
cluded:
Although neutral in form, the statute is any-
thing but neutral in" application....Where the
foreseeable impact of a facially neutral policy is
so disproportionate, the burden should rest on
the State to establish that sex-based consider-
ations played no part in the choice of the par-
ticular legislative scheme.4
The majority of defendants in powder cocaine
cases are white (approximately forty-two percent)
while only three percent of crack cocaine defendants
are white.47 Based upon these statistics, it seems clear
that harsher crack sentences are falling almost ex-
clusively on blacks. Couple these statistics with the
police procedures to fight the "war on drugs," and it
appears that the drug laws are being discriminatorily
applied.
48
The Fourth Circuit has made an effort to close
this possible line of attack by making the conclusory
statement that "there is no argument of discrimina-
tory application of the law that raises Yick Wo con-
45442 U.S. 256 (1979)(holding that a state prefer-
ence program for veterans that does not specifically favor
males, but in which males are almost exclusively
benefitted, does not deny equal protection to women).4ild., at 284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47 See Woodlee, Plan Targets Mandatory Drug Terms,
Washington Post, March 2, 1994 at D1.
48 See United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th
Cir. 1992)(Heaney J., dissenting)(noting that crack raids
are targeted at minority neighborhoods, not Caucasian
cems."49 This issue does not appear to have been
sufficiently addressed. Counsel for defendants con-
victed under the federal drug laws for crack cocaine
violations will need to develop this argument to its
fullest before the court. The Fourth Circuit has al-
ready stated that defendants will have a tough bur-
den to carry if they plan on making this "stark" im-
pact distinction.
CONCLUSION
There appears to be circumstantial evidence
available in the legislative history of the Controlled
Substances Act and the procedures followed in its
enactment to support a finding of hidden or under-
lying racial motives. However, a successful attack
on the federal sentencing scheme grounded in the
Equal Protection Clause appears to be remote at
this time.
A possible untapped alternative in attempting
to prove purposeful discrimination in the federal
sentencing guidelines is to push the "stark" dispar-
ate impact argument which is buried in the United
States Supreme Court case of Arlington Heights.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
J. Scott Perkins
neighborhoods); see also Boldt, The Construction of Respon-
sibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2245,2320
(1992)(citing studies indicating that blacks comprise 90%
of drug arrestees but only 12% of the total drug users).
4"See United States v. D'Anjou, 16 E3d 604, 612 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that sentencing guidelines equating
one unit of crack cocaine with one hundred units of pow-
der cocaine did not violate the Equal Protection Clause;
there is evidence of disparate impact, but no evidence of
discriminatory purpose).
